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Social Comparison and Influence
in Groups
DONELSON R. FORSYTH

Kathi Hudson worried that members of Operation Rescue, a pro-life group, were engaged in
illegal activities that would limit women's rights. So she infiltrated the group to spy on their
procedures and activities. Two years later she abandoned her pro-choice attitudes and became
a born-again Christian. Tobias Schneebaum (1969), a painter from New York City, encountered a tribe called the Akaramas when visiting Peru. For 6 months he lived with them, adopting their customs so completely that he joined them in attacks on neighboring tribes and
cannibalistic rituals. David Moore joined a new-age group interested in personal development,
religion, and space travel. He gradually adopted the group's standards as his own, to the point
that he believed that a passing comet was actually a spacecraft sent to collect his consciousness. He and 38 other members of the group (Heaven's Gate) tried to board the ship by
committing suicide.
Although people generally believe that their actions reflect only their personal desires and
inclinations, the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Newcomb (1943), after examining
students' attitudes over a 4-year period, concluded their attitudes changed to match those of
their classmates at college. Asch (1955) confirmed that individuals change their judgments to
match the opinions, judgments, or actions ofthe people around them. Milgram's (1963) studies
of obedience offer suggestive evidence of the limits-or absence of limits-of social influence pressure. Moscovici (1994) found that a group member who steadfastly defends a contrarian view can change the opinions of other group members. Latane and his colleagues discovered that as group members interact over time their attitudes change in predictable ways,
for people generally shift to agree with the majority unless they are spatially separated from
others (Latane & L'Herrou, 1996). In all these studies individuals' beliefs and self-appraisals
were shaped and reshaped by the groups to which they belonged.
But what is the source of the group's power over its members? Do groups intimidate their
members? Threaten them? Offer them irresistible rewards? This chapter assumes that the
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influence of a group on its members is subtle rather than intrusive, for it is rooted in the
principle of comparison: Individuals evaluate the accuracy of their beliefs and gauge the
quality of their personal attributes by comparing themselves to other individuals. The prochoice advocate who interacts with people who are utterly opposed to abortion cannot forget
that everyone in the group thin.ks the beliefs she holds are not just wrong but immoral. The
explorer who lives with a tribe that has no taboo against cannibalism perfonns such rituals
without considering bow the members of other societies might judge him. Cult members
believe that the leader's plans are reasonable ones, even though they seem outlandish to nonmembers. In such instances group members change, not because they are pressured directly by
others, but because they implicitly formulate and revise their opinions and beliefs and identify
their strengths, assets, weaknesses, and liabilities by comparing themselves to specific individuals in their group, to a generalized conception of the average group member, or to members
of other groups.
This chapter is a reminder of social comparison theory's foundations in group processes
rather than an extension of social comparison to groups. Social comparison research and
theory, by tradition, stress individualistic, psychological purposes of comparison, such as
satisfying basic drives, defining and enhancing the self, and alleviating distress or anxiety; but
Festinger (1954) used the theory to explain shifts in members' opinions, elevated motivation
and competition among members, opinion debates, and the rejection of dissenters in groups
(Allen & Wilder, 1977; Goethals & Darley, 1987; Singer, 1981; Turner, 1991; Wheeler, 1991).
This chapter revisits the theory's roots in groups before sampling some of the roles played by
comparisonlik:e mechanisms in contemporary accounts of group dynamics.

EARLY STUDIES OF COMPARISON IN GROUPS
People are influenced in substantial ways by other people. This assumption. although the
cornerstone of social psychology, flies in the face of much of Western thought. Do people
depend on others or are they self-reliant? Are they autonomous individualists or enmeshed in
complex networks of relationships? Are they group centered or relatively independent? Early
studies, such as Sherif's 1936 (1966) experimental study of norms, Newcomb's 1943 "Bennington Study," and Hyman's 1942 (1980) analysis of reference groups, not only provided
evidence of the people's social nature and the consequences of this interdependence, but also
suggested that much of this interdependence is rooted in social comparison processes.

Norms as Comparison Standards
The theoretical impact of a study is not always related to its external validity. Some of the
most important srudies in this field, despite using volunteer subjects working on inconsequential tasks in laboratory settings, have nonetheless substantially influenced subsequent theory
and research by reliably producing important social events in controlled settings, by breaking
down and identifying the components of complex social processes, or by confirming or
disconfinning some previously untested assumption of a theory or model (Mook. 1983).
Sherif's 1936 study of nonns is one such study, for even though he studied groups
working in artificial circumstances he verified one of social psychology's fundamental assumptions: "when external surroundings lack stable, orderly reference points, the individuals
caught in the ensuing experience of uncertainty mutually contribute to each other a mode of
orderliness to establish their own orderly pattern" (1966, pp. xii-xiii). Sherif, following a
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tradition established by Durkheim (1897/1966). Sumner (1906), Cooley (1909), Moore (1921),
Thrasher (1927), and Shaw (1930), argued that "rules, customs, values, and other sorts of
nonns" develop, inevitably, whenever people "come together in a situation that lasts for any
considerable time" (1966, p. 3). If a group of people find themselves in an unstructured,
ambiguous situation where they have no reference point to define their expectations, perceptions, or activities, they spontaneously seek out information from others in the group. Sherif
did not think that the group members grudgingly conform to the judgments of others, but rather
they use the information contained in other•s responses to revise their own opinions and
beliefs.
Sherif decided that the autokinetic effect provided an ideal opportunity to study this
normative process. This effect occurs when individuals seated in a totally darkened room
mistakenly believe that a fixed pinpoint of light is moving. Sherif found that over the course of
100 judgment trials most people establish their own idiosyncratic average estimates, which
usually varied from 1 to 10 inches. But when he asked dyads and triads to make judgments,
their personal estimates blended with those of other group members until a consensus was
reached. In most cases the group•s final appraisals reflected an averaging of individual's
judgments, such that members who initially believed that the dot was moving relatively large
distances (8 to 10 inches) revised their estimates downward, and those judges who reported
little or no movement when alone " saw" slightly more movement when making judgments in
groups.
Sherif's work verified the operation of social comparison processes under controlled
conditions. Although his theoretical framework maintained that the influence he observed was
caused by the development of distance norms in the groups he studied, these nonnative
processes were sustained by comparative processes. Individuals were not just acquiescing to
the group's decisions. but instead were spontaneously revising their estimates so as to reduce
the discrepancy between themselves and others:
Each compares his judgments with the others, consciously or unconsciously seeking interpersonal
support in establishing secure boundaries and reference points where none existed before. This process
is one of mutual seeking and mutual support, and oot a question of succumbing to or resisting
suggestions. (Sherif, 1966, p. xii)

Sherif also documented the relative stability of the changes created by comparisoninduced influence. When he dismantled the groups and put participants back in the room by
themselves, their judgments followed the pattern established by the group rather than the
pattern they displayed as individuals. This carryover effect convinced Sherif that he bad
documented the development of a norm rather than a momentary shift in judgment resulting
from group pressure. Subsequent researchers verified this internalization process by putting a
confederate in each three-member group. The confederate deflected the group•s consensus
upward by consistently overestimating the distance moved before he was replaced with a new,
naive subject. The remaining group members still relied on the exaggerated nonn, however,
and so this newest addition to the group gradually adapted to the higher standard. The
researchers continued to replace group members with new subjects, but new members continued to shift their estimates in the direction of the group norm. This arbitrary group norm
disappeared eventually, but in most cases the more reasonable norm did not develop until
group membership had changed five or six times (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961; MacNeil &
Sherif, 1976; Pollis, Montgomery, & Smith. 1975).
Sherif (1966) also noted, but could not completely explain, his subjects' lack of insight
into the influence process. A few individuals recognized that they were amending their
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judgments to take into account the others' judgments, but most were not aware that they were
influenced or that the group was converging on a single distance norm: "the majority of the
subjects reported not only that their minds were made up as to the judgment they were going to
give before the others spoke, but that they were not influenced by the others in the group"
(1966, p. 108). He likened this insensitivity to other perceptual illusions, in which individuals
are certain that the evidence of their senses is accurate, even when they are repeatedly
mistaken in their perceptions.

Normative Pressure in Groups: The Bennington Study
When Sherif was documenting the emergence of consensus in small groups of strangers,
Newcomb was studying shifts in college students' political attitudes at Bennington College.
Newcomb was intrigued by the dramatic shifts in public opinions in the 1930s when many
Americans changed to endorse more liberal, progressive political opinions symbolized by the
New Deal. Newcomb believed that these opinion shifts must be tied to changes in the opinions
of the groups to which individuals belonged, and he sought to document these influence
processes in the women at Bennington College. Newcomb, as a member of the faculty, could
not help but recognize the impressive change in students' opinions during the course of their
studies. Most came from politically conservative New England families who endorsed Alfred
M. Landon, the Republican candidate, rather than Franklin D. Roosevelt, a Democrat, in the
1936 presidential election. Most of the first-year students at Bennington shared the attitudes of
their families, for 62% preferred the Landon to Roosevelt. The juniors and seniors, however,
were much less conservative in their political beliefs, with only 15% endorsing the Republican
candidate (Newcomb. 1943). In explanation, Newcomb suggested that the students' unwittingly changed their beliefs to match the college community's standards. Even though they
came from families with conservative attitudes, the college community supported mainly
liberal attitudes, and Newcomb hypothesized that many Bennington women shifted their
attitudes in response to this peer group pressure.
Newcomb, like Sherif, based his explanation on one fundamental assumption: Iqdividuals evaluate their attitudes by comparing themselves to other members of their group. He
gathered indirect evidence of this comparison process by asking students to describe their own
political opinions as well as estimate the political beliefs of first-year students, juniorsseniors, and faculty at the college. His measures of political beliefs revealed that 34% of the
first-year students were politically conseivative. but this percentage was 20% and 10% for the
juniors-seniors and faculty, respectively. The women also were relatively accurate when
estimating the opinions of these groups, particularly when they were evaluating their own
groups. Seniors estimated that 61%, 30%, and 21% of the first-year students, juniors-seniors,
and faculty were conservative, thereby overestimating conservatism by 27%, 10%, and 11%.
First-year students' same estimates were 52%, 43%, and 39%, thereby overestimating conservatism by 18%, 23%, and 29%. Thus, the first-year students tended to overestimate the
conservatism of the seniors and the seniors underestimated first-year students' liberalism.
But why did the relatively conservative first-year students adopt the liberal attitudes of
another group of students (the seniors)? Newcomb found evidence that the first-year students
tended to accept the seniors as their "frame of reference" rather than their own class. He asked
each student to indicate if, on a series of items, their opinion matched the opinion of their
classmates. Overall, the women showed an "amazing tendency to assume that their own
attitude responses correspond to those of the majority of their classmates" (Newcomb, 1943,
p. 49). This tendency was much greater for seniors, however. They felt their opinions were
shared by the majority of their classmates (fellow seniors) 76% of the time. First-year students,
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in contrast, only felt that they agreed with other first-year students for 52% of the items. These
same students also felt that their attitudes corresponded to seniors' attitudes 64% of the time.
seniors, in contrast, were much more likely to feel that their opinions were different from those
expressed by the first-year students.
Newcomb felt that the opinion shifts that he documented occurred because liberal
individuals had more influence on opinions than conservative members. This greater influence
was due, in part, to the dominant values of the college, where the faculty were known for their
liberal, and even radical, viewpoints. The more popular students tended to be the more liberal
students, and those who shifted to become more liberal themselves tended to be (1) "both
capable and desirous of cordial relations with the fellow community members" (1943, p. 149),
(2) more frequently chosen by others as friendly, and (3) a more cohesive subgroup than the
conservative students. Individuals who did not become more liberal tended to express negative
attitudes toward the college community or they were very family oriented. Newcomb and his
colleagues later summarized these findings by stressing the "informational environment of the
community and the status structure embedded in that environment" (Alwin, Cohen, &
Newcomb, 1991, p. 52, italics in original).

Reference Groups as Comparative Baselines
Newcomb did not use the term "reference group" in his 1943 analysis, but his findings
are consistent with the idea that people use groups or social aggregates as standards or frames
of reference when evaluating their abilities, attitudes, or beliefs (Hyman, 1960). Any group can
function as a reference group, including those that are actually statistical aggregations of
noninteracting individuals, imaginary groups, or even groups that deny the individual membership (Singer, 1981). When students first enrolled at Bennington their family was their ·
reference group, so their attitudes matched their families' attitudes. The longer students
remained at Bennington, however, the more their attitudes changed to match the attitudes of
their new reference group, the rest of the college population.
Roper (1940) first introduced the idea of a reference group by suggesting that individuals'
perceptions of their own status depends on where they stand in relationship to other people.
For example, a man who earns $40,000 may feel very affluent if he lives in a community where
most people earn only $20,000, but this same individual will feel relatively impoverished if
living in an exclusive, high-dollar suburb. Hyman (194211980), however, is generally credited
with launching the systematic study of reference groups. At about the same time that Newcomb was completing his analysis of the Bennington findings, Hyman was exploring some of
the psychological and sociological factors that determine people's evaluations of their status in
society. He based his analysis on Lewin's (1935) general discussion of the impact of social
groups on individual's judgments and perceptions. Lewin maintained that the group, like the
ground in a figure-ground relationship, influences members' perceptions and judgments but
remains relatively unnoticed. Because people belong to many groups, their perceptions vary as
their membership in these groups become more or less salient.
Hyman applied Lewin's analysis to people's estimates of their social standing, or status.
Status, Hyman noted, is a relational attribute, for it can only be defined by comparing one's
accomplishments to other's accomplishments. When Hyman asked his respondents if they
ever thought about the standing relative to others, over 80% of his respondents reported that
they thought about their relative superiority in at least one of the following domains: economic, intellectual, social, physical appearance, cultural, athletic, prestige, character, political,
sexual, religious, self-esteem, and general achievements. Hyman suspected that many of the
remaining subjects also thought about their status but were not willing to admit it.
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Hyman asked his respondents to identify the individuals and groups they used as
reference points in determining their status evaluations in these various domains. He discov~
ered that whereas some individuals compared themselves to actual groups, such as friends,
neighbors, work groups, and their families, others used general social categories such as
race, occupation, or socioeconomic class. Some individuals used a single reference group
across all the domains. For example, one woman who worked as a nurse evaluated her
economic, intellectual, and social standing by estimating where she stood relative to other
women who were nurses. Most people, however, used multiple reference groups, particularly
when shifting from one domain to another. Some individuals also identified subgroups within
a larger reference group, like one individual who evaluated his intellectual achievements
relative to all academic people, but to social scientists in particular.
In 1950, Merton and Kitt (1950) used the concept of reference groups to reexamine
Stouffer and associates' studies of the adjustment of soldiers to military life swnmarized in
The American Soldier (Stouffer et al., 1949a; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams,
1949b). They noted that, in many cases, the men defined their attitudes about the military,
combat, and themselves by gathering information from the squads to which they were assigned. New recruits, for example, often described themselves as "ready for battle," whereas
few veterans reported any enthusiasm about combat. But when new recruits were transferred
into established combat squads, they quickly lost their fervor. The men's attitudes and
satisfactions also were shaped by comparison groups that they did not belong to, yet used as
the basis for defining the relative quality of their current situation; what Merton and Kitt called
nonmembership reference groups. Anticipating the distinction between upward and downward social comparison, the researchers discovered that soldiers who suffered the mostthose who had fewer promotions, who experienced racial discrimination, those assigned
overseas, and those serving in the front lines of battle-were not necessarily the most
dissatisfied. Rather\. those individuals who felt their privations were greater than others were
more likely to respond negatively to their military service. For example, a married man
"comparing himself with his unmarried associates in the Army" felt dissatisfied, but not so
much as a married man "comparing himself with his married civilian friends" (Stouffer et al.,
1949b, p. 125). Similarly, African-American soldiers often responded more positively to anny
life than Anglo-American soldiers, because "Relative to most Negro civilians whom he saw in
southern towns, the Negro soldier had a position of comparative wealth and dignity" (Stouffer
et al., 1949b, p. 563). Merton and Kitt concluded that if individuals compare themselves to a
group that is outperforming their group, they will experience dissatisfaction, but should they
compare themselves to a group facing even greater hardship, then they will report more
satisfaction with their own circumstances.
Studies of reference groups foreshadowed contemporary interest in such processes as
social identity, upward and downward social comparison, referent power, and social categorization and stimulated applications to "problems of mental illness, formal organization,
marketing and public relations, mass communications, acculturation, political behavior, consumer behavior, labor relations, and juvenile delinquency, as well as to opinion formation"
(Hyman & Singer, 1968, p. 7). Singer (1981) offers a comprehensive overview of this work.

Conformity in Small Groups
Other investigators continued to refine the concept of reference groups, but social
psychological researchers were more influenced by Kelley's 1952 paper, "Two Functions of
Reference Groups." In that paper Kelley drew a distinction between the nonnative function of
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reference groups and the comparative function of such groups. and suggested that prior researchers had not always distinguished between these two functions. Newcomb's Bennington
study (1943). for example. illustrated the normative function of a reference group. This highly
cohesive, isolated group developed a relatively well-accepted set of social standards, which
many members of the community accepted as their own. It functioned as a positive reference
group for most members, for they were motivated to assimilate the values of the group to
secure their acceptance by the group. In some cases, though, a group may function as a
negative reference group. Individuals may adopt standards that conflict with those of the group
to ensure their differentiation from that group.
Hyman's (194211980) original studies of reference groups, in contrast. focused on their
comparative functions. Hyman discovered that people did not derive their values from their
reference groups, but instead used them as baselines to inform their appraisals of their
prosperity. Kelley (1952, p. 412) writes, "A group functions as a comparison reference group
for an individual to the extent that the behavior, attitudes, circumstances, or other characteristics of its members represent standards or comparison points which he uses in making
judgments and evaluations." Deutsch and Gerard (1955), Thibaut and Strickland (1956), and
Jones and Gerard (1967) offer similar distinctions, and Shibutani (1955) suggests a tripartite
division: normative groups (groups whose nonns and outlooks are accepted by the individual),
comparative groups (groups that serve as reference points for comparisons and contrasts,
particularly about personal qualities), and aspired groups (groups the individual wishes to join
or maintain bis membership in). Sbibutani suggested that the tenn "reference group" should
apply only to comparative groups.
This distinction explains the two types of reactions Asch (1952, 1955) observed in his
studies of conformity. Asch, in his pioneering work on confonnity in small, temporary groups,
arranged for a single naive subject to make simple judgments about the lengths of lines in
the presence of his trained confederates who deliberately made mistakes on 12 of the 18 trials.
Asch's subjects frequently conformed, even though the task was very simple and the pressures
to agree with others were relatively minimal. Yet, on further review, Asch discovered that the
groups influenced members both by providing them with a standard judgment that was
accepted by all other members and by providing subjects with infonnation about the correctness of their original line choices. Thus, some of Asch's subjects conformed because of
informational influence: They thought they were mistaken in their personal judgment and
decided the group was correct. Others, though, were responding to nonnative pressures: they
merely went along with the majority, even though they thought the majority was making a
mistake.
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) confirmed and extended Kelley's distinction in their study of
normative social influence and informational social influence. They defined normative influence as "an influence to conform with the positive expectations of another," with positive
expectations described as "expectations whose fulfillment by another leads to or reinforces
positive rather than negative feelings, and whose nonfulfillment leads to the opposite, to
alienation rather than solidarity" (p. 629). Informational social influence, like Kelley's comparative function, occurs when individuals "accept information obtained from another as
evidence about reality" (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955, p. 629, italics in original).
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) contrasted these two fonns of influence in an Asch-type
conformity situation where naive subjects made judgments about the length of lines in the
presence of confederates who made deliberate and obvious errors. They sought to separate
informational influence from nonnative influence across a series of experimental variations. In
one condition both sources of influence were high, for like the Asch paradigm subjects made
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their judgments when seated face-to-face with others. In a second condition subjects were
sequestered in booths and the choices they made were communicated to others mechanically
rather than orally. In other conditions subjects recorded their judgments on a sheet of paper that
only they would see (self-commitment), on a sheet of paper that they had to sign (public
commitment), or on a "magic pad" (a pad that was erased by lifting up the plastic covering)
that was erased after each trial (magic pad self-commitment). They suggested that these
commitment conditions would create a second form of normative influence, in which members
would feel compelled to be "true to themselves" by not expressing opinions that they
personally did not believe. As they predicted, the number of errors was greatest in the face-toface groups, since informational and normative pressures were high. Conformity dropped
when subjects were in small booths that protected their anonymity. Findings from the commitment conditions moreover suggested that conunitment to one's choices reduces conformity,
particularly for unambiguous problems. From Deutsch and Gerard (1955, p. 634):
in the Magic Pad variation the normative influences to conform to one's own judgment had to be
sustained by the S himself. Nonnative influences from the S's self (to be, in a sense, true to himself)
were undoubtedly also operating in the noncommitment variation. What the Magic Pad did was to
prevent the S from distorting his recollection of his independent judgment after being e~posed to the
judgments of the others.... The behavior of writing one'sjudgment down on the Magic Pad makes the
original decision less tentative and less subject to change.

The distinction between normative and informational influence continues to be a central
theme in studies of social influence, but like all dichotomies the division between groups as
sources of information and groups as sources of nonnative pressure is too simplistic (Forsyth,
1999; Raven, 1992). Turner (1991, p. 147), for example, argues that "infonnational influence is
socially mediated and nonnative" and "that nonns about preferences and values are informative about appropriate, correct beliefs." He suggests that the distinction is actually referring to
the source of change: in "others," in the case of nonnative influence, or in the "self," in the
case of informational influence. Forsyth (1999) also focuses on the source of the change when
drawing a distinction between informational, normative, and interpersonal influence. Informational influence produces change through persuasion and other cognitive operations, norm.a·
tive information produces change by making salient relevant situational and personal nonns,
and interpersonal influence works by creating social pressures, such as threats, promises,
withholding of reinforcers, and so on. French and Raven (1959) expand this list to six bases of
influence: reward, punishment, legitimate, referent, expert, and infonnational. These various
conceptualizations, despite their differences, agree that influence includes both cognitive, infor·
mational, and psychological elements and interpersonal, normative, interpersonal elements.
Social Communication and Comparison in Groups
Researchers and theorists, up until Festinger's 1954 publication of his theory of social
comparison, examined comparative processes in groups, but they did not focus exclusively on
comparison per se. Sherif (1966), for example, maintained that norms result from a comparative process that diminishes once the norm is set in place; as group members compare
themselves to others a social standard emerges, which individuals then use as a reference
point. Newcomb (1943) explored the consequences of this comparative process by finding that
new group members will change their attitudes to match the majority's outlook in his Bennington Study, but he did not discuss comparison processes. Similarly, Hyman (194211980)
addressed comparison processes directly in his analysis of reference groups, but he focused on
how people select targets for comparison rather than the interpersonal consequences of that
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comparison process. Even though these early researchers did not actually use the tenn "social
comparison," the processes that they studied fundamentally depended on the individuals'
perceptions of the skills, abilities, and attitudes of the people around them.
In 1954, Festinger's pulled together these various theoretical threads and empirical
findings in his theory of social comparison. In that theory he argued that individuals have a
fundamental need for accuracy and cognitive clarity, which they satisfy by seeking out
infonnation about the accuracy of their opinions and the adequacy of their abilities by
comparing themselves to others. The theory (eventually) sired various programs of research
into self-evaluation and self-enhancement processes, but as Allen and Wilder (1977) note, it
also served to summarize Festinger's early work into the complex dynamics that occur when
members of small groups share information about their personal opinions and attitudes. These
studies, which provide a backdrop to the 1954 theory, are reviewed briefly below.

The Westgate Study. Festinger developed social comparison theory in the heyday of
group dynamics, long before the self, attributions, heuristics, and other cognitive mechanisms
captured researchers' atte~tion. As Cartwright (1979) writes in bis historical analysis of the
field, social psychology after World War II was very much a group-focused social psychology,
with major advances in studies of group cohesiveness, leadership, productivity, conformity,
and social-comparison-like processes. Much of this group-oriented emphasis resulted from
Lewin·s influence on the developing discipline, for he assumed that individuals cannot be
understood apart from the small face-to-face groups to which they belong. Indeed, Lewin's
Research Center for Group Dynamics, which he founded at MIT, was the site of Festinger,
Schachter, and Back's 1950 study of Westgate and Westgate West (Festinger, 1980).
Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950, p. 7) were convinced that "groups have power over
their members. They exert influence on their attitudes, on their behavior, and even on the kinds
of activities in which their members engage." But what is the source of this influence? To
answer this question they surveyed the residents of Westgate and Westgate West, two housing
developments filled, at random, with students and their families. These two projects offered
Festinger and colleagues (1950) an excellent opportunity to not only study group fonnation,
but also the "relatively subtle influences which are exerted during the nonnal communication
process among members of a group" (p. 7).
The Westgate studies confirmed Festinger's suspicions about the role propinquity plays
in determining the fonnation of relationships among members. Residents reported the closest
relationships with those who they encountered frequently during the course of the day, due to
the close proximity of their mailboxes or residences. But Festinger et al. (1950) also discovered
that the group members' attitudes closely paralleled these spontaneously emerging inter:
personal networks, such that "within each of these small face-to-face groups, group standards" developed that defined members' opinions on various attitudinal issues. Moreover,
"each group exerted strong influences on its members to conform to its standards," and the
effectiveness of the group in swaying its members "depended to a major extent on how
cohesive the small social group was" (Festinger et al., 1950, p. 11). Festinger believed that
some of this influence resulted from residents' conformity to the group's attitudinal normsnormative influence-but much of the influence was also rooted in social comparison:
The hypothesis may be advanced that the "social reality" upon which an opinion or attitude rests for its
justification is the degree to which the individual perceives that this opinion or attitude is shared by
others. An opinion or attitude that is not reinforced by others of the same opinion will become unstable
generally. There are not usually compelling facts which can unequivocally settle the question of which
attitude is wrong and which is right in connection with social opinions and attitudes as there are in the
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case of what might be called "facts." If a person driving a car down a street is told by his companion
that the street ends in a dead end, this piece of information may be easily checked against physical
"reality." ... The situation with regard to social opinions and attitudes is quite different, however. Here
there is no such "physical reality" against which to check. (Festi.nger et al., 1950, pp. 168- 169)

Festinger discovered that residents, during their daily interaction, discussed attitudinal issues
and thereby gained infonnation about the consensus of opinion within their groups and the
relative uniqueness of their attitudes. Individuals who expressed deviant attitudes tended to be
individuals who, due to isolation from others, could not engage in this comparative process or
misinterpreted the distribution of attitudes within their groups. But those closely connected by
friendship or membership in a clique shared "a common fund of information about a variety of
matters . ... they will know and they will not know many of the same things" (p. 167).

Communication Pressures in Small Groups. Festinger and his colleagues explored
some of the implications of the Westgate and Westgate West findings in a series of laboratory
studies and dissertation projects (Back. 1951; Festinger. Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley, & Raven,
1952; Festinger & Thibaut, 1951; Festinger, Torrey, & Willerman, 1954; Gerard. 1953; Hoffman, Festinger, & Lawrence, 1954; Schachter, 1951). These projects tested Festinger's (1950)
"informal social communication" theory, which argued that people in groups-particularly
cohesive groups-will gradually drift toward uniformity of opinion over time. His theory
suggests that when individuals find that they disagree with their group, they can (1) communicate with one another until the discrepancy is resolved; (2) change their opinion to match the
views expressed by the majority of the members; or (3) minimize the group's relevance as a
reference point by leaving the group, rejecting disagreeing group members or avoiding
information that suggests members disagree. Which of these reactions will occur depends on
the cohesiveness of the group, the nature of the attitudinal issue under discussion, and the goals
of the group.
All these studies assume group members engage in social comparison, but they focus
more on the interpersonal dynamics that this comparative process stimulates. Festinger and
Thibaut (1951), for example, studied the impact of persuasive messages on people who
disagreed with the majority of the group members. They carefully measured the persuasive
messages members of small groups sent to each other, after manipulating the stress on the
group to reach consensus, members' knowledge of the issues the group was discussing, and
their perceptions of the group's diversity. Festinger and Thibaut reasoned that these three
variables should act in concert to increase communication with people who hold extreme
opinions. When the group members felt compelled to reach agreement, then they would be
more likely to locate and influence people who held opposing views. Members also would feel
more confident in influencing others when they were secure in their beliefs, so they also should
give rather than accept influence. Members of heterogeneous groups also would be more likely
to recognize the need to communicate their opinions to others, and so would likely communicate at a higher rate. (Festinger and Thibaut, however, manipulated diversity by telling some
groups that the members varied considerably in terms of their expertise. Hence, this manipulation also may have influenced communication patterns by convincing members of the supposed heterogeneous groups that others would be more accepting of influence, since they were
less capable.) These predictions were all confinned, but Festinger and Thibaut also noted that
these pressures usually resulted in the outliers changing at a higher rate; but if they did not
change, then they were rejected by the group members. Festinger et al. (1952) extended these
results by discovering that people who have beliefs and opinions that differ to a great extent
from others withdraw from the group before the group has an opportunity to reject them.
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Schachter (1951) studied the intensity of communication efforts with a disagreeing group
member in his dissertation. He planted three kinds of confederates in a number of all-male
discussion groups. The "deviant., always disagreed with the majority. The "slider 0 disagreed
initially, but conformed over the course of the discussion. The "mode" consistently agreed
with the majority. Schachter also manipulated the groups' cohesiveness, and asked groups to

discuss a topic that was either relevant or irrelevant to group's stated purposed. He discovered
that the group members initially communicated with the mode, deviant, and slider at equal
rateS, but once they became aware of the deviant and slider's disagreement, communication
centered on these two. When the slider capitulated to the group's consensus, then the interaction shifted to the deviant alone. This concentrated communication lasted until the end of the
session in all but one type of group: cohesive groups working on an issue that was relevant to
the group goals in which members developed a negative attitude toward the deviant. In such
groups communication with the deviant dropped precipitously, evidence that group had
reached consensus by excluding him (Berkowitz, 1971; Levine, 1980).

COMPARISON IN GROUPS: CONTE:MPORARY APPLICATIONS

Even though early social psychologists did not explicitly used the term "social comparison," they nonetheless frequently investigated processes that were fundamentally driven by
comparisonli.k:e processes. Festinger and colleagues recognized the impact of comparison processes on groups, and they carried out an impressive series of studies of the postcomparison
group processes framed around the question: Once members discoyer that other people hold
differing opinions, when do they try to persuade them, when do they change themselves, and
when do they reject dissenters? Festinger stressed group processes to such an extent in his work
that he was chosen to author the groups chapter for the Annual Review ofPsychology in 1955.
Given this historical context, it is not surprising that many group researchers and
theorists, when they encounter an anomalous finding or perplexing bit of group behavior, offer
explanations that refer to the principle of comparison. Few directly test the theory's assumptions in their studies, but their theoretical conceptualizations rely on it so much that, to paraphrase Arrowood (1978), social comparison theory is everyone's second favorite explanation
of group processes. Here we consider but a sample of the theoretical analyses that rely in part
on social comparison to explain group-level processes.

Group Formation
Schachter (1959), in his classic analysis of affiliation, took Festinger's (1950, 1954)
theories of social communication and comparison one step farther by suggesting that individuals, when in need of information, will seek out others so that they can detennine whether their
views are "correct," "valid," and "proper" (Festinger, 1950, p. 272). He tested this idea by
leading his subjects to think that they were going to receive a series of electric shocks. He
discovered that 63% of the women who were told the shocks would be very painful (highanxiety condition) preferred to await their turn with other people, but that only 33% of those
told the shocks would be hardly noticeable chose to wait with others (low-anxiety condition).
Schachter maintained that these differences in affiliation reflected participant's need for
information and the satiation of that need through social comparison processes, and he
summarized his findings with the phrase "misery loves company" (see Chapter 15, this
volume).
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Contemporary analyses continue to stress the informational value of joining with others

in groups, but add additional functions served by groups, such as esteem, social support,
identity,'the opportunity to influence others, and self-exploration (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, &
Cotting, 1999; Helgeson & Michelson, 1995; Wright & Forsyth, 1997). Many of these alternative functions are sustained, in part, by social comparison processes. Social identity theory, for
example, stresses the value of achieving a collective identity based on categorizing oneself as a
group member. These categorization and identification processes that are posited by the
theory, however, assume that members compare themselves to the prototypical group member
and compare their own group to other groups ('Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,
1987; see Chapter 19, this volume).
Studies of downward and upward comparison also confinn the self-esteem building and
threatening consequences of comparisons with groups and group members whose performance, adjustment, skills, abilities, or aptitudes are relatively superior or inferior. When group
members compare themselves to members who are experiencing even more severe hardships
or are failing to cope well with their problems, members' sense of victimization decreases and
their self-esteem increases (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985).
When they compare themselves to people who are coping effectively with their problems, this
upward social comparison helps members identify ways to improve their own situation and
promotes their feelings of hope (Buunk, 1995; Snyder, Cbeavens, & Sympson, 1997). But
upward comparison can also undermine self-esteem. Wheeler and Miyake (1992), for example, asked students to keep track of the people they compared themselves to over a 2-week
period; they found that students reported feeling depressed and discouraged when they
associated with superior people. Taylor, Falke, Shoptaw, and Lichtman (1986) suggest that
self-help groups, or support groups, that include people who are coping extraordinarily well
with their illness can make other members feel as though their coping efforts are inadequate.
Because these negative consequences of upward comparison appear to be greatest when
comparisons involve attributes or skills that are central to individuals self-definitions (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997), individuals may deliberately avoid joining groups that include people
who outperform them in spheres they consider to be personally important. Extending Tesser,
Campbell, and their associates's self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) model to groups suggests
that ideal groupmates perform worse on tasks that other members think are important but very
well on tasks that other members do not think are important. Such associates provide members
with targets for downward social comparison, and by drawing attention to their association
with them, members bask in the glory of their accomplishments in areas that do not interest
them (Tesser, 1988, 1991; Tesser & Campbell, 1983; Tesser, Campbell, & Smith, 1984). Indeed,
Winkel and Renssen (1998) report that individuals may not understand the comparison needs
of the fellow group members, and so too frequently provide them with upward social
comparison information ("The same thing happened to Ed, but he's doing fine now") rather
than downward social comparison information ( ..You are doing so much better than Ed").

Social Influence and Social Comparison
As early theorists like Asch (1955) and Kelley (1952) noted, people sometimes conform,
not because they are pressured by others or because they are loathe to deviate from the group's
norms, but because they discover new information about a situation by observing others'
responses. When individuals face ambiguous situations or see others acting in unexpected
ways, they undertake a systematic analysis of their position to determine whether it requires
revision. If this review reveals additional information relevant to their opinions, then they
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revise those opinions, not because they buckle under social pressure but because the data
gathered from social sources provide them with a·new interpretation (Allen & Wilder, 1977).

Majority Influence and Social Comparison. Mackie (1987) investigated the cognitive
foundations of conformity in groups by leading her subjects to believe that they were part of a
small minority that disagreed with the majority on such matters as foreign policy and juvenile
justice. After her subjects listened to members of both the minority and the majority argue their
positions, Mackie asked them to record their thoughts and reactions. These thoughts, when
analyzed, revealed that the subjects recalled more thoughts that were consistent with the
arguments offered by those who disagreed with them, particularly when they were members of
the minority. Mackie also found that people who processes the majority's message more
extensively also changed their opinions more than those who did not process the message (De
Dreu & De Vries, 1996; Trost, Maass, & Kenrick, 1992).
Allen and Wilder (1980) argued that exposure to others' positions, in addition to stimulating thoughtful analysis of available evidence, also can cause group members to reinterpret, or
cognitively restructure, key aspects of the issue (Allen & Wilder, 1980; Tindale, Smith,
Thomas, Filkins, & Sheffey, 1996; Wood, Pool, Leck, & Purvis, 1996). They documented this
restructuring by asking subjects to define the meaning of certain phrases in a series of
statements. Each statement was accompanied by information about the opinions of a previous
group of participants, and subjects' interpretations of the phrases were influenced by this
information about opinions. If, for example, the subjects were shown the item. "I would never
go out of my way to help another person," and then they learned that a four-person group had
unanimously agreed with the statement, subjects interpreted the phrase 14go out of my way" to
mean "risk my life" rather than "be inconvenienced" (Allen & Wilder, 1980, p. 1118). In such
situations people who spend more time thinking about the issues are the ones who conform
more (Campbell. Tesser, & Fairey, 1986).
Social comparison also generates conformity by capitalizing on group members' willing·
ness to use heuristics when they process information gathered in social situations. Although
Festinger (1954) assumed that social comparison serves the need for accurate information
about the correctness of one's opinions when cognitive resources are limited or the motivation
to do the cognitive work necessary to weigh the information available is minimal, people use
heuristics to generate decisions efficiently and rapidly (Baker & Petty, 1994; Peterson &
Nemeth, 1996; Wood et al., 1996). When individuals are in groups and social comparison processes convince members that most of the group members are in agreement, then such heuristics as "majority rules" will prompt them to accept the majority's viewpoint (Chen, Schechter,
& Chaiken, 1996). As a result, when people are asked why they changed their opinions in
conformity situations, they rarely admit that others influenced them, for these changes were
driven by hard-to-access heuristic thought rather than systematic thought (Buehler & Griffin,
1994~ Griffin & Buehler, 1993).

Minority Influence and Social Comparison. Researchers, in the years since Festinger
and colleagues (1950) demonstrated that groups tend to become more attitudinally homogeneous over time, have sought to explain why some groups change to agree with the minority's
position. This work was stimulated in large part by Moscovici's (1994) studies of the impact
of a consistent minority on a majority. Moscovici argued that minorities influence majorities
by creating "cognitive conflicts" that challenge the status quo of the group by calling for a
reevaluation of issues at hand. Such a minority undermines the majority's certainty and forces
the group to seek out new social comparison information. When a minority is present, groups
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take longer to reach their conclusions and they are more likely to consider multiple perspectives when drawing conclusions (Peterson & Nemeth, 1996).
Nemeth and Wachtler (1983) examined minority influence by having people work a series
of puzzles alone, in groups, or in groups with a consistent minority. When people worked
alone, their solutions were not very creative, and when they worked in a group, they usually
just picked the solution favored by the majority. But when a minority of two confederates
argued for a nonobvious solution, the group's solution was more creative. The group did not
necessarily accept the minority's proposal, but the minority did stimulate reevaluation of the
original answer. Other research suggests that minorities are the most influential when they
adopt a consistent behavioral style and offer compelling arguments and the majority is
uncertain of the correctness of its position (Witte, 1994). Minorities become less influential
when the other members of the group redefine the boundaries of the group so that the minority
is thought to be a member of the out-group (Alvaro & Crano, 1997). All these factors influence
the impact of minorities by changing their value as sources of social comparison. Just as the
individual who hears that eight other people favor position X is likely to reconsider her
decision to favor Y, exposure to two individuals who consistently and enthusiastically argue
that Z is the correct choice stimulates cognitive reevaluation of the available information. Ifthe
minority's viewpoint is a reasonably one, the group may shift to adopt it; but if the majority
continue to favor an alternative, then the communication pressures that Festinger (1955)
identified will likely be brought to bear on the dissenters.
This comparison process may lead to immediate change, but as Moscovici (1994) argues
in many cases the impact of the minority on the majority emerges only over time. His dualprocess model of minority influence argues that individuals who are part of the group's
majority rarely review the argwnents that support their position. But when they discover,
through social comparison, that someone in the group disagrees with them, they must devote
more cognitive resources to their position. This review may not lead to change immediately,
but it may cause members to change their positions at a later time or on a related task
(Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969).
Collective Information Processing
Festinger's (1950) early studies of communication in groups argued that such communication is functional, for it creates channels through which information flows among members.
Similarly. recent studies of groups maldng decisions suggest that groups, when faced with a
problem in need of solution. use discussion as a vehicle for gathering social comparison
information. Indeed, many procedures used by groups to control discussion-rules of discussion (such as Robert's Rules of Order), voting, round-robin presentations like the nominal
group technique, secret ballots, and straw polls-deliberately augment or suppress the collection of social comparison information (Hinsz, Tmdale, & Vollrath, 1997; Kerr, MacCoun, &
Kramer, 1996).

Jury Decisions. Juries, by design, free members from comparison pressures. They
meet for a limited period of time in a highly formal setting and members are cautioned not to
engage in any discussion of the case before they begin deliberations. Indeed, as Hastie, Penrod,
and Pennington (1983) note, many juries move toward their final verdict cautiously. These
evidence-driven juries deliberate by first reviewing the evidence available, and only then try to
create a coherent story that accounts for the questioned events.
Hastie and colleagues, however, also identified a second type of jury: one that engages in
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social comparison as the first stage of deliberation. They call such juries verdict driven, for
members "advocate only one verdict at a time," and they cite evidence to support their
preferred interpretation. The deliberation also tends to contain "many statements of verdict
preferences and frequent pollings" (1983, p. 163).
This striving for social comparison information speeds up the deliberation process, for
verdict-driven juries needed only 63% of the time an evidence jury uses to make its decision
(Hastie et al., 1983). The discussion in such juries also tends to be less rigorous and fails to a
degree to tie the evidence presented during the trial to the legal specifications of the charges.
The two types of juries, though, do not differ consistently in the verdicts they favor.

Oversampling Shared Information. Stasser and colleagues have discovered that
groups' reliance on social comparison to reach agreement on decisions has one negative consequence: groups spend too much of their discussion time examining shared informationdetails two or more of the group members know in common-rather than unshared information (Stasser, 1992; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996). This bias,
although not always calamitous, can cause the group to make an incorrect decision if the full
disclosure of all information would yield the correct solution, whereas the disclosure of only
shared information yields an incorrect decision.
This tendency to oversample shared infonnation reflects, in part. the dual functions of
social comparison identified by Kelley (1952)'. As a means of acquiring data, discussions help
individuals process the information they need to make good decisions. But as a form of
normative influence, discussions give members the chance to influence each others' opinions
on the issue. Discussing unshared information may be informationally useful, but discussing
shared information helps the group reach consensus on the matter. Indeed, group members
who anticipate a group discussion implicitly focus on infonnation that they know others
possess, instead of concentrating on information that only they possess (Wittenbaum, Stasser,
& Merry, 1996); and they discuss shared information first and only later get to unshared
information (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994).
Consensus Estimation and Pluralistic Ignorance. Just as oversampling shared information can lead group members to make errors, too little social comparison can cause group
members to misinterpret the amount of consensus present in their groups. Janis (1982), in his
insightful analysis of group~ argues that many disastrous decisions are caused by group
members' assumption of consensus when consensus does not, in fact, exist. In his case studies
of groups that made disastrous decisions he repeatedly discovered that the members seemed to
agree so completely that they only went through the motions of debate. Members' retrospective accounts usually revealed that many of the group's members had grave doubts about the
decisions being made, but they short-circuited social comparison processes by not expressing
their misgivings during the meetings. In such settings Janis (1982, p. 39) believes group
members play up "areas of convergence in their thinking, at the expense of fully exploring
divergences that might disrupt the apparent unity of the group."
Miller and McFarland (1991, p. 287) review empirical studies of the conceptually similar
process known as pluralistic ignorance: "a state characterized by the belief that one's private
thoughts, feelings, and behavior are different from those of others, even though one's public
behavior is identical." They trace this concept back to Allport (Katz & Allport, l9f8), who
used the tenn to explain instances in which a substantial proportion of a group privately
disagrees with a group decision, practice, or standard, yet the unpopular element remains
firmly entrenched in the group. Latane and Darley (1970) use this concept to explain why
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bystanders sometimes mistakenly interpret an emergency as a nonemergency. Although the
indivi~ual witness feels that something is wrong, he or she misinterprets the nonreaction of
others as evidence that no help in fact is required. This misinterpretation could be corrected if
individuals share their interpretation of the situation rather than only relying on others
behavior as evidence of the nature of the problem.

Attitude Polariz;ation and Comparison. Researchers in the 1960s, after intensive anal·
ysis of the tendency for groups to make riskier decisions than individuals, concluded that the
so-called risky-shift was part of a larger, more general process. When people discuss issues in
groups, they tend to make more extreme decisions than would be suggested by the average of
their individual judgments. Discussion, rather than subduing and moderating, polarizes:
Judgments made after group discussion are more extreme in the same direction as the average
of individual judgments made prior to discussion (Myers & Lamm. 1976).
Researchers initially argued that this polarization process occurs because people in
groups feel less responsible for their decisions and are overly influenced by risk-prone leaders.
In time, however, they recognized that the shift is likely a comparative processes (Isenberg,
1986). When people make decisions individually, they have no way to determine whether they
are risk averse or risk takers. But when group members make choices together, they use others
as an index of their risk-taking tendencies (Goethals & Zanna, 1979; Myers, 1978). Polarization occurs because group members, through discussion, discover the group's norm, or
average, degree of risk. and they stake claim to a position that exceeds that norm in whatever
direction the majority of the members endorse (usually risk). AB Brown (1974, p. 469)
explains, "To be virtuous ... is to be different from the mean-in the right direction and to the
right degree." Polarization may also occur because the presence of more risky (or more
cautious) individuals "releases" the individual group member from normative constraints in
the group, so that they feel free to express more extreme opinions (Pruitt, 1971). Social
comparison theory also explains why just knowing the positions of the other people in the
groups, and not the reasons behind these opinions, is sometimes sufficient to produce polarization (Blascovich, Ginsburg, & Howe, 1975).
An alternative explanation of group polarization-persuasive arguments theory (Vinokur
& Burnstein, 1974, 1978)-focuses on informational influence rather than interpersonal and
normative influence. This theory assumes that individuals base their decisions on the number
and persuasiveness of the argwnents that they have for and against each position. If, for
example, a group generates more arguments favoring a risky choice than a cautious choice
during discussions, then the group will polarize. And groups can, in most cases, generate more
argwnents that support the position endorsed by the majority of the group or the position that is
most consistent with dominant social values, in part because members may be more willing to
express arguments that are consistent with social nonns. In all likelihood, then, polarization
processes are sustained by comparison processes that not only provide members with addi·
tional cognitive infonnation, but also help them determine whether their views are ''correct, ..
" valid," and "proper" (Festinger, 1950, p. 272).
Social Loafing and Comparison
Ringelmann (1913), a French agricultural engineer, was the first researcher to document
the loss of productivity in groups working on collective tasks. Even though groups generally
outperform individuals, they rarely reach their full potential. Inadequate coordination of effort
explains part of this productivity loss, but much of the loss is caused by social loafing: People
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do not work quite so hard in groups. This loss of motivation is sustained, in part, by members'
tendency to compare their contributions. Group members may want to do their share to help
the group reach its goals, but they do not want to do more than their share. So they compare
their contributions to those of others, and reduce their effort so that it matches the average rate.
Loafing increases when this comparative process convinces group members that their coworkers are holding back. Hence, groups loaf less when they are confident that others are also
working hard, when individual contributions are known, and when a standard can be used to
evaluate performance (see Karau & Williams, 1993).
The same productivity-limiting processes explain the relatively poor performance of
brainstorming groups, for social comparison processes conspire to lower standards for performance when generating ideas. Although undercontributors are challenged to reach the pace
established by others, overcontributors tend to reduce their contributions to match the group's
mediocre standards. This social matching effect tends to lower performance levels overall, but
it can be minimized by increasing feelings of competition among members (Brown & Paulus,
1996; Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993; Seta, Seta, & Donaldson, 1991). Social matching also
undermines productivity in groups working via computers (Paulus, Larey, Putman, Leggett,
& Roland, 1996). Researchers controlled how much information was exchanged among
participants with three types of displays. Some subjects saw only their own ideas, others
gained access to all the group's ideas at the end of the session, and still others were shown
a continuously updated list of ideas generated by the group members. Group members who
could monitor others' idea production in real time-they could see each new idea as it was
posted rather than waiting for a summary at the session's end-displayed social matching.
Their rate of idea generation decreased during the course of the session to match the production rates of the other group members (Roy, Gauvin, & Limayem, 1996)

Studies of Normative lnftuence
Social comparison-of the more nonnative than informational variety-also influences
the transmission of religious, economic, moral, political, and interpersonal beliefs in groups.
Conceptually extending Newcomb's (1943) Bennington Study, Crandall (1988) found that
eating disorders, such as excessive dieting, binging, and purging, are supported by group
norms. The college women he studied who did not purge began to purge when they joined a
sorority in which the most popular members purge. And which women were the most popular
in these groups? Those women who purged at the rate established by the group's norms.
Fisher (Fisher, 1988; Fisher & Fisher, 1993) also links healthy and unhealthy behavioral
tendencies to comparison-based processes. Even though people recognize the consequences of
unprotected sex, they rarely take steps that will reduce their vulnerability to AIDS and other
sexually transmitted diseases. Indeed, people often claim that the threat of AIDS has made
them more cautious when it comes to sex, but self-reports of change do not always correspond
to behavioral changes. Fisher, in explaining this gap between health attitudes and healthy
behaviors, notes that social norms do not support preventive behaviors. Norms of many
college campuses are either silent on the issue of condom use or openly antagonistic. Norms
may even encourage some risk·increasing behaviors by sanctioning casual relationships and
promoting the value of risk. Some social groups may embrace a risky practice to such a degree
,
that the individual risks ostracism by breaking the norm.
Prentice and Miller (1993) describe a related cycle of nonnative influence in their study of
alcohol abuse on a college campus. Most of the students who participated in their study
endorsed a personal norm against overindulgence, but they believed that their campus's norms
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encouraged heavy alcohol consumption. The men responded to this normative influence by
gradu~y internalizing the misperceived norm. They began to drink more the longer they
stayed at the school. The women, in contrast, responded by distancing themselves from their
university and its norms about drinking (Prentice & Miller, 1993).
Normative influence also can be used to promote healthy, prosocial behaviors. Fisher
(1988), for example, bas developed an extensive educational program designed to change
people's perceptions of norms related to sexual conducted. Similarly, Cialdini and colleagues
have used normative social influence to increase pro-environment actions (Cialdini, Kallgren,
& Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). In their field studies of littering they
distinguish between descriptive norms and injunctive norms. Descriptive norms promote
informational influence, for they define what most people would do, feel, or think in a
particular situation. Injunctive norms, in contrast, promote nonnative infiuenc.e by including
an evaluative component. "Most people don't litter" is a descriptive norm, whereas ..Harming
the environment is wrong" is injunctive. Cialdini contrasted these two forms of influence in a
field study of subjects getting into their cars. Subjects encountered a confederate either in the
lot where their car was parked or on the path leading to the parking lot. In the descriptive nonn
condition the confederate dropped a bag of trash into a garbage can. In the injunctive norm
condition the confederate picked up a piece of litter and disposed of it in the garbage can. In the
control condition the confederate merely walked by the subject. When subjects reached their
car, they found a handbill under their windshield wipers. Descriptive norms were nearly as
influential as injunctive nonns, but their impact wore off rapidly. If the encounter between the
subject and the confederate occurred in the parking lot only 17% of the subjects in the
descriptive norm condition littered. lbis percentage jumped to 36%, however, if the confederate's litter-conscious actions had occurred on the path leading to the lot. In contrast, the
injunctive norm became more powerful over time. No one who saw the confederate pick up
litter on the path leading to the lot littered (Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993, study 3).
This distinction between descriptive and injwictive norms is consistent with Festinger's
(1950) original insights. As l)e noted, social comparison lets people determine whether their
conclusions are accurate ( " correct"), whether their perceptions are veridical ("valid"), and
whether their actions are moral ("proper" ). Additional research is needed to determine the
role that comparison processes play in determining moral thought, judgment, and action, for as
Miller and Prentice (1996, p. 799) note, "there is nothing either good or bad but comparison
makes it so."

Social Comparison as Group Process
Social comparison theory argues that people, by comparing themselves to others, can
satisfy a profusion of personal motives (Helgeson & Michelson, 1995). They can, as Festinger
(1954) originally noted, erase their self-uncertainties by comparing their beliefs and abilities to
others. People also can raise their self-esteem by comparing themselves to worse-off others
(Wills, 1991), buoy up their hopes through comparison with high achievers (Major, Testa, &
Bylsma, 1991), and reassure themselves by comparing themselves to people who are not
worried (Affleck & Tennen, 1991). They can even confirm their sense of uniqueness by
discovering their views are relatively unique ones (Goethals, Messick. & Allison, 1991) or
downplay their idiosyncrasies by recognizing they are shared by many others (Gross & Miller,

1997).
But social comparison theory is as much a theory about group dynamics as it is a theory
about individual's perceptions of their opinions and abilities. The theory springs from studies
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of small, interacting groups, for Festinger used the principle of comparison to explain why
groups tend to be homogeneous with respect to attitudes and values. It remains a central tenet
in studies of reference groups' power to sway the attitudes of their members. The principle of
comparison also has informed researchers' and theorists' analyses of group formation, affiliation, social identity, majority influence,· minority influence, group discussion, polarization,
social loafing, brainstorming, and the transmission of beliefs and values from groups to
individuals. Indeed, this chapter, by only sampling the ways that researchers and theorists have
used the concept of comparison to explain the behavior of individuals in group contexts,
underestimates the impact of the concept. Given its importance as an explanatory concept,
perhaps the theory should be elevated from number 2 to number 1: from "everyone's second
favorite" theory of group processes to "everyone's favorite theory."
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